Trying to stop Nathan Cofnas from speaking at Oxford risks giving him precisely what his opponents want to deny him: a larger audience, drawn toward a subject that intimidation makes more alluring. On Tuesday evening, November 17, 2026, hundreds of protesters filled the streets around Oriel College. People from inside and outside the university took part in violent disorder intended to stop students and other attendees from hearing the academic speak.
The human cordon did not merely obstruct the lecture. It also prevented students from reaching their rooms. One student recalls being told, when he tried to pass: “Don’t try and break the picket line, mate. It makes you look as though you hate black people.” A convenient moral test: wanting to get home becomes evidence against you.
Cofnas had become prominent earlier in the year as the first academic to expose the fraud of Cambridge University academic Jason Arday. His work brought into public view what had long been suspected inside Cambridge: plagiarism, false résumé claims, and invented elements of Arday’s life and career. That record justified neither his professorship nor the celebrity surrounding it.
Arday subsequently died by suicide as public scrutiny intensified. His death was followed by a considerable escalation in accusations against those who had exposed his fabrications. Lord Simon Woolley, the principal of Homerton College, Cambridge, told a demonstration in London’s Trafalgar Square that Arday, who was Black, had suffered a “lynching” and a “public assassination.” Woolley now says he intended those expressions metaphorically.
Even as metaphors, those words carry weight. There is no reason to assume everyone protesting in Oxford understood them that way. A dispute becomes considerably more combustible when exposing falsehoods is described as killing someone.
Cofnas appears to have committed two offenses in his opponents’ eyes. The first was exposing Arday’s dishonesty. Defending Arday on that ground requires either believing his record fully qualified him for a Cambridge chair despite the revelations, or accepting that academic standards may be relaxed for someone who meets the requirements of diversity, equity, and inclusion. Cofnas’s employer, Ghent University, appears sympathetic to that position: it suspended him after Arday’s death and announced that it intended to investigate him for discrimination.
The second offense runs deeper. Cofnas has researched and written about race and IQ. Few subjects today are more thoroughly forbidden.
Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein addressed it in a chapter of their 1994 book The Bell Curve. James Watson has spoken about it. So has David Reich, a Harvard genetics professor, who discussed the issue in The New York Times in 2018. Reich argued that researchers should be able to explore differences in average intelligence between populations while avoiding stereotypes and premature conclusions.
In a book published alongside that intervention, Reich explained his research and the obligation to describe facts. He expressed “deep sympathy for the concern that genetic discoveries could be misused to justify racism.” That acknowledgment did not prevent a backlash. To many critics, opening the discussion at all appeared to breach a protective dam.
Objections, including those of Ezra Klein, then writing for Vox, ranged from challenging the research’s validity to fearing its consequences: an uninformed public might treat any connection between race and IQ as permission to discriminate against groups assigned a lower average.
That concern is not absurd. Once findings enter public circulation, nobody controls every use made of them. But secrecy is not a workable system for managing knowledge, especially in the age of social media. Nor is it accidental that Cofnas, who has called himself a “race realist,” was speaking at Oxford about DEI.
Years ago, I warned that this development was predictable. If DEI continued expanding, those who felt most targeted by it—particularly young, straight, white men—would look for a counterargument commensurate with its reach. When the same identity categories shape decisions from education to hiring, those disadvantaged by those preferences may reach for the heaviest available weapon. Race and IQ was an obvious candidate. Obvious, and dangerous.
The first reason is the prohibition itself. Arguments on this subject have more often been suppressed than answered. Oxford’s violence reinforces that impression, as did repeated attempts to stop Charles Murray from speaking, including an assault on one occasion.
If Cofnas’s claims are wrong, academics and students should be able to demonstrate that. At Oxford, however, they did not try to establish his error before a small audience of students attending in their spare time. They tried to prevent the meeting and then keep its audience outside. That is not intellectual confidence. It is a preference for holding a doorway over sustaining an argument. The forbidden subject becomes more attractive as a result.
The second reason concerns the logic of retaliation. DEI asks that people be judged throughout their lives by their characteristics rather than their capabilities. Members of majority populations come to feel discriminated against because they are being discriminated against. Countless books and articles have challenged the doctrine and its implementation. But someone short on time or patience may want something more immediate than a methodical rebuttal.
The temptation is to reverse the argument brutally: perhaps you avoid discussing capabilities because your own innate characteristics put you at a disadvantage; perhaps you are genetically inferior. That would be a harmful response. I am not saying it represents Cofnas’s position. I am saying it could appeal to many young white people, and the expanding interest in racial IQ differences makes the risk impossible to dismiss.
For at least a decade, the subject has surfaced in public debates ostensibly devoted to all manner of other questions. Genetics contains plenty of academic disagreements. Few travel from scholarly discussion to opinion pages and then into the streets. This one does because it has the potential to detonate across society.
DEI advocates have repeatedly made collective judgments, particularly through the language of “privilege.” Each generalization has encouraged opponents to make their own. It is difficult to declare that all white people possess some characteristic and then claim a principled prohibition against sweeping statements by the other side. That contradiction does not make the retaliatory claims sound. It makes them easier for their proponents to justify.
Many may consequently disregard the considerable variables involved in racial IQ differences and concentrate only on evidence suggesting different group averages. Inquiry loses its concern for limitations. It becomes an arsenal.
Yet the serious response to Cofnas’s research remains available: produce research and arguments that answer it. Deploying extraordinary physical and institutional force against a recently obscure junior academic risks achieving the opposite of the intended result.
How people discuss these questions matters, too. Someone who approaches them as the ethical and moral minefield they are can combine curiosity with concern. Someone who announces conclusions—accurate or otherwise—with delight is probably pursuing something else. To judge Cofnas’s tone, it would first be necessary to hear him.
His opponents believe they can dispense with that step. By refusing to listen, they give many others a reason to do so. Worse, violence may persuade some of his present and future audience to seek not merely findings in the statistics, but weapons. If those listeners decide to go to war with them, the people blocking the doors will have supplied another argument: they will be able to maintain, with some justification, that they did not begin the hostilities.
